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Case Comment
Education or Indoctrination-Removal of Books from
Public School Libraries: Board of Education,
Island Trees Union Free School District No.
26 v. Pico
INTRODUCTION
Acting on a list of books considered objectionable by a po-
litically conservative statewide parents organization,' the
Board of Education of the Island Trees Union Free School Dis-
trict No. 26 2 ordered all "listed" works removed from its librar-
1. Three members of the Board had obtained the list at a conference
sponsored by "Parents of New York United" (PONYU). See Pico v. Board of
Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 389 (E.D.N.Y.
1979). The books PONYU considered objectionable were: K. VONNEGUT JR.,
SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE (1969); D. MORiuS, THE NAKED APE (1967); P. THOMAS,
DOWN THESE MEAN STREETS (1967); BEST SHORT STORIES BY NEGRO WRITERS
(L. Hughes ed. 1967); ANONYMOUS, Go ASK ALICE (1971); 0. LAFARGE, LAUGH-
ING BOY (1929); R. WIGHr, BLACK BoY (1945); A. CHILDREss, A HERO AIN'T
NoHIN' BUT A SANDWICH (1973); E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE (1968); A READER
FOR WRITERS (J. Archer ed. 1971); and B. MALAmUD, THE FIXER (1966). See 474
F. Supp. at 389 nn. 2-4. These books are commonly selected for high school li-
braries nationwide and are on many recommended reading lists. In fact, The
Fixer won the Pulitzer Prize for Letters in 1967. See Comment, Censoring The
School Library: Do Students Have the Right to Readl 10 CONN. L. REV. 747 n.4
(1978).
In addition to the authors and titles of the objectionable books, the PONYU
list contained quotations from the books as well as editorial comments. See
Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d
404, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1980). For example, Eldridge Cleaver, author of Soul on Ice,
was described as the "[1] eader of Black panther [sic] and not allowed to live in
America." See id. at 407. The list further stated that the book was "FULL OF
ANTI-AMERICAN MATERIAL AND HATE FOR WHITE WOMEN," and spe-
cifically cited what it considered to be objectionable passages, including-
"There are white men who will pay you to fuck their wives. They approach you
and say, 'How would you like to fuck a white woman?"' E. CLEAVER, supra note
1, at 158-59. Another example of a passage that led to a work being found objec-
tionable by PONYU is from Oliver LaFarge's Laughing Boy: "'I'll tell you, she
is all bad; for two bits she will do the worst thing."' 0. LAFARGE, supra note 1,
at 38. For a full listing of editorial comments and identification of "objectiona-
ble" passages by PONYU, see Pico, 638 F.2d at 419-22 n.1 (Mansfield, J., dissent-
ing); Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 102 S.
Ct. 2799, 2823-27 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
2. The Island Trees Union Free School District is located in a suburban
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ies. The superintendent of schools eventually persuaded the
Board to follow the established book removal procedure,3
which entailed appointing a committee of school staff and par-
ents to make appropriate recommendations. The Board, how-
ever, ultimately rejected most of the committee's
recommendations, banning all but two of the works from school
libraries.4 In response, a group of students brought suit to com-
pel the Board to return the books to the library, arguing that
the Board action violated their first amendment rights.5 After
community on Long Island, New York. The district's population is almost en-
tirely white and largely Italian and Irish. See Comment, supra note 1, at 747
n.3.
3. Initially, the Board, following the adjournment of a regularly scheduled
meeting, "unofficial[ly] directed" the superintendent of schools and the junior
and senior high school principals to immediately remove the listed books,
pending a later Board decision. Pico, 474 F. Supp. at 390. Three days after this
directive, the superintendent sent a memorandum to the Board stating that
since the school district already had a policy on book removals, the Board
would be best advised to adhere to the normal procedure. That procedure re-
quired the superintendent, after receiving an objection to a book, to appoint a
committee to study the work and make recommendations on retaining it. Pico,
638 F.2d at 409.
The Board's president responded with a memorandum of his own to the su-
perintendent, which again directed that "all copies of the library books in ques-
tion" be removed immediately. Id. (emphasis in original). Shortly after this
exchange of memoranda, the New York press learned of the book removal. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1976, at 24, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1976, at 29, col.
1. At a press conference, the Board explained their action by stating that the
works in question included material offensive to "Christians, Jews, Blacks, and
Americans in general," and that the books contained "obscenities, blasphemies,
brutality, and perversion beyond description." Pico, 474 F. Supp. at 390. The
Board's press release concluded that Board members, as elected officials in
charge of education, had a duty and a moral obligation to remove the books. Id.
at 390-91. The Board, however, finally appointed a separate committee to read
and make recommendations about the books. Id.
4. The committee recommended the retention of five of the books: The
Fixer, Laughing Boy, Black Boy, Go Ask Alice, and Best Short Stories of Negro
Writers. The works it suggested for removal were: The Naked Ape and Down
These Mean Streets. The committee was unable to reach a consensus on two
works, Soul On Ice and A Hero Ain't Nothin' But a Sandwich, and did not have
an opportunity to consider A Reader for Writers. Finally, the committee recom-
mended that students have access to Slaughterhouse-five only with parental ap-
proval. Id. at 391.
The Board agreed with the committee that Laughing Boy should be re-
tained. The Board also voted to allow students access to Black Boy, but only
with parental approval. The nine remaining books were completely banned by
the Board. See supra note 1.
5. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 474 F.
Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). Led by student council president Steven Pico, the
students initially brought their action in state court, but the defendant Board
had the suit removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). See Pico, 638 F.2d at 406
n.l. Originally, the plaintiffs asserted five causes of action: (1) violation of the
N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, guarantee of liberty of speech, (2) violation of U.S.
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the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Board,6 and a split Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded the case for trial,7 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.8 A divided Court affirmed the Second Circuit,9 the
plurality holding that the Board could not remove the texts
from the library shelves if their action was motivated by a dis-
like for the ideas contained in the books and was an attempt to
deny students access to those ideas.' 0 To prevail on remand,
therefore, the students would have to show that the Board had
acted with such a constitutionally impermissible motive."
CONST. amend. I, (3) and (4), violations of the two preceding provisions as ap-
plied to school librarians, and (5) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See Pico,
474 F. Supp. at 393-94. The district court held that the plaintiffs had no standing
to assert claims (3) and (4) against the librarians and that, of the remaining
causes of action, only the § 1983 action alleging a violation of first amendment
rights was necessary to allow the plaintiffs to vindicate their rights. Id. at 394.
6. Judge Pratt based his decision in favor of the Board on the Second Cir-
cuit's previous holding in Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community School
Board No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972), which gave
school boards unfettered discretion on book removals. Pico, 474 F. Supp. at 394-
97. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
7. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 638
F.2d 404, 419 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit remanded to the district court
the determination of whether the Board's action was prompted by a dislike of
the ideas contained in the books. All three judges on the panel wrote separate
opinions, and their divergent viewpoints are underscored by their opinions in a
companion case, Bicknell v. Vergenness Union High School Bd. of Directors,
638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980) (removal by school board of Patrick Mann's Dog Day
Afternoon from the library shelf and placement of Richard Price's The
Wanderer on a restricted shelf held valid). Judge Newman, writing for the
court in Bicknell, stated that students had no constitutional right of access to
material fairly characterized as indecent and vulgar. He distinguished the
cases on the basis that in Bicknell there was no suggestion that the Board had
removed books because of the ideas contained in the works or because of polit-
ical motivation, while in Pico these were very real concerns. Id. at 441. Judge
Sifton, of the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation, favored or-
dering both school boards to return the removed books to the library. Id. at
442-43 (Sifton, J., dissenting); Pico, 638 F.2d at 418 n.13. Judge Mansfield, on the
other hand, concluded that neither board had violated the constitution. Bick-
nell, 638 F.2d at 442 (Mansfield, J., concurring); Pico, 638 F.2d at 419, 425-29
(Mansfield, J., dissenting). Thus, while a majority of the judges thought the
two cases indistinguishable, Judge Newman's distinctions prevailed.
8. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 454
U.S. 891 (1981). See infra note 110.
9. The Justices wrote seven separate opinions. See infra note 101.
10. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 102
S. Ct. 2799, 2810 (1982).
11. On August 12, 1982, the Board voted to return all nine of the removed
books to the library shelves. Its decision not to continue litigation was
prompted by the advice of the Board's counsel, and also a petition signed by
1200 parents. See Nocera, The Book-Banning Brawl, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept.
13, 1982, at 20, 24.
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Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District
No. 26 v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
Book removals from school libraries dramatize the inher-
ent tension between two goals of public education. On the one
hand, public schools have traditionally played a role as trans-
mitters of societal values.12 In acknowledging that society may
legitimately use schools as a mechanism for "inculcating funda-
mental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system"13 and that schools are "the primary vehicle for
transmitting 'the values on which our society rests,' "14 the
Supreme Court and other courts have consistently recognized
that the states and their local school boards have primary and
comprehensive control over public education.15 Accordingly,
the judiciary has been reluctant to meddle in school affairs,' 6
frequently recognizing that school boards need broad discre-
tionary powers.' 7
Counterpoised to the socialization function of the school is
the concept of freedom of inquiry. The first amendment's ob-
jective of preserving a free marketplace of ideas from which en-
lightened discussion will ultimately lead to truth's is especially
12. "[A] principal function of all elementary and secondary education is
indoctrinative-whether it be to teach the ABC's or multiplication tables or to
transmit the basic values of the community." James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d
566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972) (school could not discharge
teacher for wearing black armband protesting the Vietnam War if such expres-
sion did not disrupt classroom activities and did not influence the students).
Judge Mansfield, a dissenter in the circuit court decision in Pico, was a mem-
ber of the unanimous three judge panel that rendered the James decision. See
also Note, Removal of Public School Library Books: The First Amendment Ver-
sus the Local School Board, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (1981).
13. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (upholding statute prohibit-
ing aliens from teaching in the public schools unless they intended to become
U.S. citizens).
14. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (state could not exclude illegal
aliens from the public schools) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. at 76).
15. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
16. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
17. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305-06 (7th
Cir. 1980). Even courts that reverse school board actions note that they do not
seek to limit a school board's traditionally wide discretion in prescribing curric-
ula, setting classroom standards, and evaluating teachers. See, e.g., James v.
Board of Educ., 461 F.2d at 575; Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623,
633 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 952 (1973) (school board could not dis-
miss teacher who refused to salute the flag). Of course, schools could still
serve as inculcators of societal values even if the discretionary authority rested
at some other level of government, such as the state. Local control, however,
helps ensure that schools transmit local values to students. See infra notes 63-
66 and accompanying text.
18. "It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, polit-
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important in a school setting because students are entitled to,
and a quality education requires, exposure to a broad range of
ideas. Even though open inquiry hampers the inculcating func-
tion, the Court has long recognized that a local school's power
to socialize is limited: the state cannot use public education to
"foster a homogeneous people" 19 by standardizing children, be-
cause a child is not a mere creature of the state.2 0 Conse-
quently, the state's interest in universal education must be
balanced against those fundamental rights and interests upon
which state action might impinge.21 When faced with direct
and sharp implications of basic constitutional values, the judici-
ary has forgone its normal reluctance to intervene in daily
school operations,22 especially upon proof of interference with
a student's first amendment rights.2 3 Declaring that "[i]t can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,"24 the Court has found "scrupulous" protec-
tion of students' constitutional rights necessary to avoid
"strangl[ing] the free mind at its source and teach[ing] youth
to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes."25
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN FREE INQUIRY AND
ACCULTURATION
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FREEDOM OF INQUIRY
Central to delineating the first amendment's contours in a
school setting is that provision's major goal of safeguarding the
free exchange of information necessary for a self-governing
ical, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences .... " Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
19. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (law forbidding teaching in
a foreign language and teaching a foreign language to students held
unconstitutional).
20. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (striking down Ore-
gon statute prohibiting parents from sending their children to private schools).
21. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972) (statute compelling
Amish parents to continue to send their children to school after the eighth
grade declared unconstitutional because it infringed upon the fundamental
right of free exercise of religion and the parents' interest in raising their chil-
dren as they saw fit).
22. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). See infra notes 60-61 and
accompanying text.
23. Official interference with teachers' first amendment rights can also
evoke judicial involvement in school operations. See supra note 17.
24. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
25. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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people.26 James Madison, who headed the committee that
drafted the first amendment, stated: "A popular Government,
without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is
but a Prologue to a Farce or Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowl-
edge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to
be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power
which knowledge gives."27 The underlying assumption of the
amendment is that only by allowing all viewpoints to be ex-
pressed will truth be attained because truth will ultimately pre-
vail in the competition of ideas. 28 Thus, the state is not
permitted to suppress ideas it believes are incorrect; rather, it
may only put forth its own ideas as rebuttal.29
The first amendment seeks to insure the free flow of infor-
mation by prohibiting government restriction of expression
"because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its con-
tent."30 In certain circumstances the state can prescribe rea-
sonable "time, place, or manner" restrictions on
communication, but only when the regulations apply irrespec-
tive of what is being said.31 Consequently, the state can regu-
late to some degree when and where the exchange of
information occurs, but cannot regulate which ideas are being
discussed. To allow content regulation of expressive activity-
censorship-would contradict the "profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
26. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech
.... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. "[F]reedom of expression is essential to provide
for participation in decision-making by all members of society. This is particu-
larly significant for political decisions.... [T]he governed must ... have full
freedom of expression both in forming individual judgments and in forming the
common judgment." T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7(1970). Even apart from the role it plays in the political process, the first
amendment is important because it promotes individual fulfillment and self-re-
alization. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). See also Whitney v. Cal-
ifornia, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); L TRIBE, AmERicAN
CONsTrrTUTONAL LAw 578-79 (1978).
27. 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910), quoted in Pico,
102 S. Ct. at 2808.
28. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
29. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
30. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (ordinance prohibiting picketing in the vicinity of
school invalid because, in allowing exception for labor union picketing, the
state had not been content-neutral).
31. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94
(1977) (ordinance banning "for sale" and "sold" signs in an effort to stem the
exodus of white homeowners from a racially integrated town invalidated as
content regulation of speech). But cf. Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427
U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning restrictions on "adult" theaters).
[Vol. 68:213
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uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."3 2
Courts have employed the first amendment's proscriptions
in two basic ways to limit a local school official's actions. In
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,33 the
Supreme Court held that school officials could not compel a
student to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag because the
state could not force individuals to express any particular view-
point. The Court pronounced that "[i]f there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, national-
ism, religion, or other matters of opinion."3 4 Not until Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District,3 5 how-
ever, did the Court expressly extend first amendment protec-
tion to expressive conduct actually initiated by elementary and
secondary school students.3 6 In Tinker, local school officials
had suspended several students for wearing black armbands to
protest the Vietnam War. Overturning the suspension, the
Court declared that "First Amendment rights, applied in light
of the special characteristics of the school environment, are
available to teachers and students."3 7
Through Barnette and Tinker, the Court has established
that a school official's discretion is limited by a student's consti-
tutional right to expression. A local school board's removal of a
work from its library, however, infringes upon freedom of ex-
pression less directly. The board is not forcing students to pro-
fess to ideas in which they do not believe, as in Barnette, nor is
the board preventing students from voicing an opinion, as in
Tinker. These officials are nonetheless denying students ac-
cess to the ideas contained in the removed works. To vindicate
32. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964)). See also TamE, supra note 26, at 580-82.
33. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See supra text accompanying note 25.
34. Id. at 642.
35. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
36. T. EMERSON, supra note 26, at 609. Tinker has been proclaimed the
"pathfinder" case in the recognition of students' rights of expression. See Com-
ment, Removal of Books from School Libraries by School Board Violates Stu-
dents' First Amendment Rights .- Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District
541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), 45 U. Cha. I REV. 701, 703 (1976) (citing Dermo,
Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to School, 38 FoRDHAM L REV. 35, 53
(1969)).
37. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. The special circumstances of the school envi-
ronment do require, though, some limitations on students' first amendment
rights that would not be acceptable outside of an educational context. Specifi-
cally, students cannot be allowed to materially and substantially disrupt the
work and discipline of the school, or infringe upon the right of other students.
Id. at 509, 514.
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their right to prevent book removals, student plaintiffs have
had to look beyond Barnette and Tinker, finding support in two
related concepts that encourage freedom of inquiry.
1. The Right to Receive Information
A fairly recent constitutional development promoting the
free exchange of information is the right to receive informa-
tion.38 The Supreme Court first suggested the existence of this
constitutional protection in Martin v. City of Struthers,39 where
the Court voided an ordinance prohibiting the door-to-door dis-
tribution of religious literature. Not only did the ordinance vio-
late the distributor's right to disseminate messages through
both literature and speech, the Court declared, it also inter-
fered with a willing recipient's .right to obtain the literature.40
Yet, the Court seemed reluctant to rest its decision on the
rights of recipients, referring only in dicta to the right to re-
ceive information.4 1 Nearly twenty years later, in Lamont v.
Postmaster General,42 the Court relied on a recipient's first
amendment rights in striking down a law that required an ad-
dressee to return a reply card to the Post Office before mail
could be received from foreign Communists. The Court rea-
soned that by requiring the card's return the state had imper-
missibly placed an affirmative obligation on addressees'
enjoyment of their first amendment rights. The Court did not,
however, specify the exact nature of the first amendment rights
involved.43
38. See, e.g., Note, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HAST. CONST. L.Q.
109 (1977); Note, The Right to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 TEx. L
REv. 505 (1979); Emerson, Legal Foundations of The Right to Know, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1, 6 (1976). The evolution of this right has predominantly taken place
outside of the academic setting. For application of the right to receive informa-
tion in the classroom, however, see infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
39. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
40. Id. at 149. The drafters of the first amendment "chose to encourage a
freedom which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to
triumph over slothful ignorance. This freedom embraces the right to distribute
literature . . .and necessarily protects the right to receive it." Id. at 143. In
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), in the context of holding that company
policy in a company town could not prevent the distribution of religious litera-
ture, the Court again mentioned, in dicta, the right to receive information as an
alternative ground for decision. Id. at 508-09.
41. Note, The Right to Know in First Amendment Analysis, supra note 38,
at 508.
42. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
43. Foreign nationals do not have a constitutional right to use the United
States postal system. Cf. id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan,
in his concurrence, was more explicit in his reliance on the right to receive in-
formation: '"The right to receive publications is ... a fundamental right." Id.
[Vol. 68:213
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A majority of the Court finally expressly embraced the con-
cept of a constitutional right to receive information in Stanley
v. Georgia,44 calling that right "well established" and "funda-
mental to our free society."45 There the Court voided a statute
making possession of pornography in a private residence a
crime, finding that individuals had a right to obtain publica-
tions regardless of the publication's content.46 Moreover, in
that same year a unanimous Court proclaimed that individuals
have a right to suitable access to a variety of ideas and exper-
iences. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,47 the Court used
the right to receive information as a basis for upholding the
FCC's "fairness doctrine," which requires broadcasters to pro-
vide time for rebuttal to opinions expressed on controversial
issues.
Perhaps the most important right-to-receive-information
case, though, is Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.48 In Virginia State Board, the
Court struck down a state law prohibiting licensed pharmacists
from advertising the price of prescription drugs. The law had
been challenged by consumers, potential recipients of the infor-
mation. The Court stated that "where a speaker exists ... the
protection afforded [by the first amendment] is to the commu-
nication, to its source and to its recipients both."49 Virginia
State Board is significant because it extends the right to re-
ceive information so as to allow the intended recipient of spe-
cific information its protection even when the sender is
unspecified. 0
Brennan reasoned that the distribution of ideas would be of no avail unless the
addressee was free to receive and contemplate them. Id. Another postal con-
troversy appeared nine years later in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974),
in which the Supreme Court struck down prison regulations that restricted the
flow of personal mail to and from inmates. The Court stated that both the
senders and recipients of communication enjoy first amendment protection
against "unjustified governmental interference with the intended communica-
tion." Id. at 408-09.
44. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
45. Id. at 564.
46. Id. The Court emphasized that although "[s]tates retain broad power
to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by
the individual in the privacy of his own home." Id. at 568.
47. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
48. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
49. Id. at 756.
50. Id. at 756-57. See also Note, The Right to Know in First Amendment
Analysis, supra note 38, at 510.
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2. Academic Freedom
Academic freedom, another concept which promotes the
free exchange of information, has been defined as "that aspect
of intellectual liberty concerned with the peculiar institutional
needs of the academic community."51 According to the Ameri-
can Association of University Professors (A.A.U.P.), the con-
cept of academic freedom incorporates much of the function of
the first amendment in the academic community: "Institutions
of higher education are conducted for the common good and
not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or
the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon
the free search for truth and its free exposition."5 2
In contrast to its treatment of the right to receive informa-
tion, the Court has never tried to establish academic freedom
as an independent constitutional right. Instead, the Court has
"confined itself to eloquent but isolated statements on the sig-
nificance of academic freedom," generally considering aca-
demic freedom as one factor relevant to a decision.5 3 A
recurring fact pattern in which the Court discusses academic
freedom involves governmental inquiry into university profes-
sors' political views.5 4 For example, in Keyishian v. Board of
Regents,5 5 the Court invalidated a statute requiring college in-
structors to sign oaths attesting that they were not Commu-
nists. The Court denounced orthodoxies in the classroom,
emphasizing the importance of academic freedom: "The Na-
51. Developments in the Law--Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045,
1048 (1968). The concept had its origin in the medieval university-a commu-
nity of scholars engaged in the pursuit of knowledge. EMERSON, supra note 26,
at 593.
52. AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIVERSrrY PROFESSORS & ASS'N OF AMERICAN COL-
LEGES, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE (1940), re-
printed in EMERSON, supra note 26, at 594. The statement is also printed
annually in the A.A.U.P. Bulletin. See, e.g., 64 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 108 (1978).
53. EMERSON, supra note 26, at 610, 616. See infra notes 54-62 and accompa-
nying text.
54. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-96 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (striking down a required loyalty oath for university profes-
sors); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (reversing a profes-
sor's contempt conviction for failing to answer questions concerning possible
subversive activities); Id. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960) (striking down a statute which required all
teachers-secondary and post-secondary-to list their organizational
memberships).
55. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Keyishian drew upon the precedents of Wieman,
Sweezy, and Shelton. See supra note 54. The Court then utilized Keyishian in
both Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See infra notes 60-62 and accom-
panying text.
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tion's future depends upon leaders trained through wide expo-
sure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovered truth
'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind
of authoritative selection.' "56
The Court has also discussed the concept of academic free-
dom in the secondary school setting. In Meyer v. Nebraska,5 7
the Court struck down as a due process violation a statute
prohibiting foreign language instruction in public schools.58
The Court concluded that one of the statute's defects was that
it "interfere [d] ... with the opportunities of pupils to acquire
knowledge."5 9 Interference with educational inquiry was also
one defect of an Arkansas statute that prohibited the teaching
of evolution in public schools. In Epperson v. Arkansas,60 the
Court relied on the establishment clause to overturn the stat-
ute, the majority not wanting to "re-enter the difficult terrain"
of academic freedom which the Court had "traversed" in
Meyer.61 The Court also addressed the issue of academic free-
dom in Tinker, declaring that "state-operated schools may not
be enclaves of totalitarianism," and "students may not be re-
garded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate." 62
56. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press,
52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
57. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
58. Some jurists have criticized Meyer as an example of the Court substi-
tuting its own judgment for that of the legislature in the era of substantive due
process. See, e.g., Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 540 (10th Cir. 1979)
(teachers unsuccessfully challenged school board decision not to approve ten
books for use in English classes). Yet, Professor Emerson thinks that the
Court would probably still reach the same result in Meyer today, though rest-
ing on different grounds-likely either a modified form of substantive due pro-
cess or first amendment protection. EMERSON, supra note 26, at 600.
59. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 401. The statute's other faults were that
it interfered with language teachers' opportunities to make a living and with
parents' power to control their children's education. Id.
60. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
61. Id. at 105-06. Justice Stewart in his concurrence discussed academic
freedom more explicitly. He reasoned that a state could legitimately determine
which academic subjects would or would not be included in the curriculum but
could not criminally sanction a teacher for merely mentioning the existence of
an entire system of respected thought. Id. at 115-16.
Professor Emerson suggests that the Court should have rested its decision
on the right to receive information instead of the establishment clause. Emer-
son, supra note 38, at 8.
62. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
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B. ACCULTURATION AND THE LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD
1. Board Discretion
Although the Tinker goal of avoiding a "closed-circuit"
treatment of students does limit local school board discretion,
local boards have traditionally enjoyed nearly complete control
in determining how the educational process will socialize stu-
dents. Communities are able to transmit societal values to stu-
dents via public education because popularly elected local
boards usually administer the schools. 63 Since the local school
board is so close to the people it represents,64 constituents can
readily express their reactions to board decisions, particularly
at the next election. The Court has, in fact, repeatedly recog-
nized that the respective states and their local boards have pri-
mary responsibility for education. 65 This responsibility
includes more than simply providing students with basic skills;
it also entails transmitting democratic and community values. 66
Accordingly, the Court has stated that the judiciary should
not involve itself with ordinary conflicts in the school,67 nor
should judges, acting merely on personal beliefs, overturn
school officials' decisions.6 8 "The system of public education
that has evolved in this Nation," the Court has declared, "relies
necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school admin-
istrators and school board members."69 Additionally, school of-
ficials have more latitude in regulating speech than do other
state officials because students constitute a captive audience
and, unlike adults, they are not free to leave presentations
63. The local school board has traditionally enjoyed almost exclusive con-
trol over public education in the United States. Niccolai, The Right to Read and
School Library Censorship, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 23 (1981).
64. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2822 (Powell, J., dissenting).
65. Most states have in turn delegated the primary responsibility for public
education to the local school board. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507; Epperson,
393 U.S. at 104; Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305
(7th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of Zykan, see infra notes 86-91 and accompany-
ing text.
66. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
67. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104.
68. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (upholding expulsion of stu-
dents for violating school prohibition against possession of alcoholic beverages
at school or school activities).
69. Id. The Court continued, "[Section] 1983 was not intended to be a ve-
hicle for federal-court corrections of errors in the exercise of that discretion
which do not rise to the level of violations of specific constitutional guaran-
tees." Id.
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which offend them.70 Some courts have gone so far as to assert
that "the First Amendment leaves undisturbed the power of lo-
cal officials to prescribe the curriculum and teaching tech-
niques of the schools in their care."7 1
2. Minors and Obscenity
Society also attempts to socialize its members by regulat-
ing their exposure to obscenity, an area the Court declared to
be outside of first amendment protections in Miller v. Califor-
nia,72 and such regulation can legitimately be stronger when
dealing with children. In Ginsberg v. New York,7 3 the Court up-
70. Thomas v. Board of Educ., Granville Cent. School Dist., 607 F.2d 1043,
1049 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
71. East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 851 (2d Cir.)
(Meskill, J., dissenting), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 562 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1977).
Judge Meskill wrote for the majority in the later decision. See also Develop-
ments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 51, at 1052-54.
In James v. Board of Education, the court noted that "courts consistently
have affirmed that curriculum controls belong to the political process and local
school authorities." 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
For an example of a court reversal of a school board curriculum decision, see
Pratt v. Indep. School Dist. No. 831, Forest Lake, Minn., 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir.
1982) (school board's ideologically-based removal from the curriculum of a film
concerning Shirley Jackson's short story The Lottery violated students' first
amendment rights).
72. 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973). Thus, if the materials which a school board
sought to remove were constitutionally "obscene," the students clearly could
not challenge the removal. To be "obscene," a work "taken as a whole" must
lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" and must appeal to
the '"prurient interest in sex." Id. at 24. The majority in Miller conceded that
banning "obscenity" may restrict ideas as well, but they reasoned that any-
thing which would constitute obscenity would not be an "essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and [would be] of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that [might] be derived from them [would] clearly be out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id. at 20-21 (quoting
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957)). Justices Douglas and Black
protested that even the standards announced in Miller and Roth impermissibly
restricted thought. See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 40 (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Roth, 354 U.S. at 508-14 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
While many school boards have objected to books on library shelves be-
cause of vulgar language, no board has claimed that the objectionable books
constituted obscenity under Miller. See, e.g., Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2802 n.2; Presi-
dents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 409 U.S. 998, 999 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting to denial of cert.); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High
School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438, 441 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980); Zykan v. Warsaw
Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1302 n.4. (7th Cir. 1980); Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 580 (6th Cir. 1976). Interestingly,
the chairperson of the school board in Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School
Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978), asserted early in the controversy that
the objectionable work was "obscene" under Miller, but at trial, the Board did
not make such a claim. Id. at 705 n.1. The Board's counsel probably informed
the Board that such an assertion would be futile.
73. 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968).
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held a statute prohibiting the sale to minors of materials that
would not have been obscene for adults, noting that in seeking
to protect children the state could constitutionally promulgate
different obscenity standards for minors than for adults.74
Seven years later, despite declaring unconstitutional an ordi-
nance that prohibited drive-in theaters from showing movies
displaying nudity, the Court again noted that "[iut is well set-
tled that a state or municipality can adopt more stringent con-
trols on communicative materials available to youths than on
those available to adults." 75 Finally, in FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion,76 the Court approved FCC sanctions imposed on radio
stations that played a monologue containing "indecent" but not
obscene language. The much-maligned 7 plurality opinion ex-
pressed particular concern about young children being exposed
to the broadcast.7 8
Relying upon Ginsberg and Pacifica Foundation, Judge
Newman 79 of the Second Circuit concluded in his concurring
opinion in Thomas v. Board of Education8 0 that school officials
can regulate distribution on public secondary school campuses
of materials containing indecent language. He declared that
schools had a responsibility to promote standards of decency
and civility among students, and that the first amendment did
not prevent schools from taking reasonable steps toward attain-
ing this goal. Moreover, he reasoned that many students, who
comprised a captive audience, as well as their parents, legiti-
mately expected the school to reasonably regulate vulgarity.
Judge Newman reasoned that if the FCC could keep indecent
language off the radio, then a school could stop indecent lan-
74. Ginsberg adopted the "variable obscenity" approach suggested in
Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MnN. L. REV. 5, 68-70 (1960). Dean Lockhart and Professor Mc-
Clure argued that obscenity should be defined in terms of the tastes and so-
phistication of the work's intended audience. Id. See also J. NOwAK, R.
ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITIONAL LAw 836-37, 843-44 (1978).
75. Erzonoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975). The Court
voided the ordinance as an impermissibly overbroad effort to protect minors.
The Court said that any restrictions placed on dispersing protected information
to minors must be narrowly drawn. Id. at 213.
76. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The piece at issue was George Carlin's monologue
entitled Filthy Words.
77. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AmERIcAN CONsTrUrIONAL LAw 67-68 (Supp. 1979);
Comment, Not on Our Shelves; A First Amendment Analysis of Library Censor-
ship in the Public Schools, 61 NEB. L. REv. 98, 112-13 (1982).
78. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749.
79. For Judge Newman's role in Pico at the circuit court level, see supra
note 7.
80. 607 F.2d 1043, 1053, 1058 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
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guage from circulating on school grounds.81
II. THE BOOK REMOVAL DILEMMA
A. PREVIOUS LOWER COURT DECISIONS
The first case to deal specifically with the tension between
free inquiry and acculturation in the context of a challenge to a
school library book removal strongly supported the accultura-
tion goal. Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community School
Board No. 2582 recognized school board discretion to the virtual
exclusion of first amendment considerations. The Second Cir-
cuit reasoned that since the school board could freely select li-
brary books, it could naturally freely remove them. 83 Citing
Epperson's admonition to the judiciary to avoid intervention in
daily school operations, the court concluded that no constitu-
tional issue was present.84 The Supreme Court denied certio-
rari in Presidents Council, but Justice Douglas vigorously
dissented, asserting that in the absence of disciplinary risks,
students should have the right to total ideological exposure.85
Although not recognizing a student's right to total ideologi-
cal exposure, the Seventh Circuit established some theoretical
limits on a school board's inculcating power in Zykan v. War-
81. Id. at 1057.
82. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). The local school
board removed Down These Mean Streets by Piri Thomas from the junior high
school library. The book, an autobiography of a boy growing up in Spanish
Harlem, contains descriptions of sex, violence, and drugs. See generally O'Neil,
Libraries, Liberties and the First Amendment, 42 U. Cmn. L REv. 209 (1973); Le-
vine, School Libraries: Shelving East Harlem, 1973 Crv. Lim. REV. 1.
83. Presidents Counci, 457 F.2d at 293.
84. See supra text accompanying note 22. Moreover, the court implied that
a school library book removal could never constitute a constitutional transgres-
sion: "To suggest that the shelving or unshelving of books presents a constitu-
tional issue, particularly where there is no showing of a curtailment of.freedom
of speech or thought, is a proposition we cannot accept." Presidents Counci4
457 F.2d at 293 (emphasis added). Other courts have pointed to the emphasized
phrase as a means for limiting the Presidents Council holding, although their
efforts are less than convincing. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School
Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 1976); Salvail v. Nashau Bd. of Educ., 469 F.
Supp. 1269, 1273-74 (D.N.H. 1979). A fair reading of Presidents Council indicates
that the court would allow school boards to remove library books even if stu-
dents could demonstrate that freedom of speech was harmed. See Note, First
Amendment Limitations on the Power of School Boards to Select and Remove
High School Text and Library Books, 52 ST. JoHN's I. REV. 457, 467 (1978).
85. Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 409 U.S.
998, 999-1000 (1972) (Douglas J., dissenting to denial of cert.). Justice Douglas
asked, "What else can the School Board now decide it does not like? How else
will its sensibilities be offended?" Id.
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saw Community School Corporation .86 That court resolved the
conflict between these two goals by declaring that school
boards could not completely deny student access to a certain
viewpoint by unshelving all the books espousing that position.
In Zykan, students challenged a library book removal,87 claim-
ing that it was motivated by school officials' personal beliefs.
The court, however, concluded that local school boards could
properly make decisions based on their own social, political,
and moral views88 because they were elected officials with
broad discretion and because high school students have not yet
developed "the intellectual skills necessary for taking full ad-
vantage of the marketplace of ideas."8 9 This lack of maturity,
coupled with society's need to imbue community values, was
held to be sufficient to limit a student's right to academic free-
dom.90 Nevertheless, the court warned that a book removal
would violate the first amendment if it was part of a "system-
atic effort to exclude a particular type of thought," or was the
result of some identifiable "ideological preference." 91
While Zykan placed a very high burden on student plain-
tiffs, Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District,92 a case de-
cided in the years between Presidents Council and Zykan,
concluded that school boards should be saddled with the bur-
86. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980). See generally Note, School Board Removal
of Books From Libraries and Curricula-Pico v. Board of Education and
Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 30 U. KA. L. REv. 146 (1981).
87. The book removed was Go Ask Alice. The plaintiffs also unsuccess-
fully challenged school decisions to eliminate certain books from use in the
curriculum and to not rehire a particular English teacher. After the school offi-
cials removed the books in question, they gave them to a senior citizens group
for a public burning. Zykan, 631 F.2d at 1302 n.2.
88. Id. at 1305.
89. Id. at 1304.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1306. The court thus allowed the students to amend their com-
plaint to comply with the court's definition of the cause of action. Id. at 1308-09.
92. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976). The school board in Minarcini had ordered
Joseph Heller's Catch 22 and Kurt Vonnegut's Cat's Cradle removed from the
school library. The students also objected to the board's refusal, contrary to a
faculty recommendation, to approve Catch 22 and Vonnegut's God Bless You,
Mr. Rosewater as a classroom or library text. The court found no constitutional
violation in the Board's withholding of this approval. Id. at 579. See generally
Comment, Board of Education's Removal of Selected Book From Public High
School Library Violates Students' First Amendment Right to Receive Informa-
tion, Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976),
55 TEx. L. REV. 511 (1977); Comment, supra note 36; Comment, School Library
Censorship: First Amendment Guarantees and the Student's Right '. Know, 57
U. DET. J. URB. L. 523 (1980); Comment, Student's Right to Receive Information
Precludes Board's Removal of Allegedly Offensive Books from High School Li-
brary, 30 VANin. L. REV. 85 (1977).
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den of persuasion in the struggle between acculturation and
open inquiry. In contrast to other courts of appeals, the Sixth
Circuit spoke forcefully for freedom of inquiry, using the right
to receive information to justify student access to library
books.93 The Sixth Circuit declared that a school board could
remove library books only for reasons neutral in terms of the
first amendment, namely reasons not based on a book's con-
tent. Because the Board had offered no neutral explanation for
the book removal, the court was forced to accept the plaintiff's
contention that the removal was based upon board members'
personal distaste for the book's content. Such a purge, the
court concluded, violated a student's right to receive
information.94
A number of district courts have followed Minarcini,95 with
Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee9 6 provid-
ing important elaboration. In Right to Read, the district court
ordered the school committee to return the challenged text to
the high school library.97 The court noted, however, that not all
book removals would violate the first amendment; removals
based on a "substantial and legitimate governmental inter-
est"--something comparable to Tinker's requirement of a disci-
93. The Supreme Court had previously dealt with the right to receive infor-
mation in an academic setting, but the case did not involve secondary educa-
tion and the Court's statements were dicta. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753 (1972), the Court confronted the issue of whether academicians could force
the United States Attorney General to issue a temporary visa to a foreign jour-
nalist to enable him to participate in a speaking tour of college campuses. The
Court held that because Congress had plenary power over immigration it need
not consider first amendment concerns, and the Attorney General exercising
delegated authority could deny the visa on the basis of a facially legitimate rea-
son. Id. at 769-70. The Court did state, however, that it had "recognized that
this right [to receive information and ideas] is 'nowhere more vital' than in our
schools and universities." Id. at 763 (citing, inter alia, Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)).
Thus, Mandel can be read as implying that the academicians' right to receive
information would have prevailed but for Congress's exceptional power over
immigration. Id. at 767.
94. Minarcini, 541 F.2d at 581-83.
95. See, e.g., Sheck v. Baileyville School Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me.
1982) (granting a preliminary injunction compelling the school board to return
to the library Ronald Glasser's 365 Days, a nonfictional collection of war ac-
counts by American combat troops); Salvail v. Nashau Bd. of Education, 469 F.
Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979) (school board could not remove Ms. magazine from
the library).
96. 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
97. The work in question was an anthology of adolescent writings, Male
and Female Under 18. The school committee objected to sexually candid lan-
guage in the poem, The City to a Young Girl.
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plinary threat-would pass constitutional muster.98 No such
interest was present in the committee's action, according to the
court, despite the officials' professed attempt to protect stu-
dents from vulgar language in one of the poems in the book.
The offense taken by some parents at the poem's vocabulary
did not establish that it would actually harm children, espe-
cially in the face of expert testimony to the contrary.99
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
Faced with a variety of alternatives for resolving the ten-
sion presented by book removals, 0 0 the Supreme Court was
left badly divided by Board of Education Island Trees Union
Free School District No. 26 v. Pico.101 The plurality opinion, au-
thored by Justice Brennan, recognized a school board's broad
discretion in administering public education 02 and its need to
use the curriculum to transmit societal values.103 Even so, the
plurality rejected the Board's claim that its discretion in per-
forming the inculcating function should be completely unfet-
tered, reasoning that school boards, like other governmental
98. Right to Read Defense Comm., 454 F. Supp. at 713. See supra note 37
and accompanying text.
99. Right to Read Defense Comm., 454 F. Supp. at 713.
100. See, e.g., Harpaz, A Paradigm of First Amendment Dilemmas: Resolv-
ing Public School Library Censorship Disputes, 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1981);
Niccolai, supra note 63; Note, supra note 12. For example, the Second Circuit
appeared to take a new interstitial position contrary to its earlier holding in
Presidents Council when it handed down its Pico and Bicknell decisions on the
same day. Judge Sifton, writing for the circuit court in Pico, distinguished the
case from Presidents Council, because Pico involved "unusual and irregular in-
tervention in the school libraries operations by persons not routinely con-
cerned with such matters." Pico, 638 F.2d at 414; see supra note 7. For works
discussing Pico before the Supreme Court rendered its decision, see, for exam-
ple, Comment, supra note 1; Note, supra note 86; Comment, supra note 77; and
Note, What Are the Limits to a School Board's Authority to Remove Books From
School Library Shelves? Pico v. Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free
School District No. 26, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 417.
101. The plurality opinion was written by Justice Brennan. Justices Mar-
shall and Stevens concurred in the entire opinion, while Justice Blackmun con-
curred in all but one section and Justice White concurred in the result only.
See infra note 110. The plurality limited its holding to the issue of book re-
moval from a school library; it explicitly refrained from ruling on the issues in-
volved in decisions regarding the curriculum and library book selection. Chief
Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Rehnquist, Powell,
and O'Connor concurred. Additionally, Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate
opinion in which every dissenter but Justice O'Connor concurred. Finally, Jus-
tices Powell and O'Connor wrote separate dissents in which no other jurist
concurred.
102. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2806.
103. Id.
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entities, must respect the first amendment. 104 Consequently,
the judiciary must scrutinize educational officials' decisions
that sharply and directly implicate constitutional rights.105
A sharp and direct implication of first amendment rights is
present when a school board removes a book from the school
library, the plurality concluded, because an unshelving could
violate a student's right to receive information.106 The prevail-
ing Justices based their conclusion on a student's need for ex-
posure to a multiplicity of ideas in order to prepare for
adulthood in our pluralistic society and on the rationale that
students should not be merely docile recipients of whatever the
state chooses to communicate. 107 Although conceding that any
student's first amendment rights must be construed in the spe-
cial context of the educational setting, the plurality found
school libraries an especially appropriate location for the recog-
nition of students' first amendment rights.108
Accordingly, the plurality concluded that school boards
cannot use book removals to establish an orthodoxy. 09 The
motivation behind the book removal determines whether the
board is establishing an impermissible orthodoxy. A removal
based on educational suitability would thus be valid. The plu-
rality, in fact, believed that the student-respondents had implic-
itly conceded that the Board could remove the books if their
true concern was vulgarity. On the other hand, if the Board in-
104. Id. at 2807.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2808.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2809. The Court stated that the library is the principal location
for students to pursue their freedom "to inquire, to study and to evaluate." Id.
(quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). Moreover, "a
library is a place [for a student] to test or expand upon ideas presented to him,
in or out of the classroom." Id. (quoting Right to Read Defense Comm. v.
School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715 (D. Mass. 1978)). The plurality conceded
that the school board's claim for freedom from judicial scrutiny would be
stronger in the area of curriculum decisions, as opposed to decisions concern-
ing the noncompulsory environment of the library. Additionally, the plurality
opinion cited the substantial role school boards play in determining a school
library's content. Id.
109. Id. at 2812. The plurality concluded that ample evidence supported the
possibility that the Board had intended to deny students access to ideas and
that the district court had thus erred in granting the Board's motion for sum-
mary judgment. Evidence indicating that the Board's removal of the books was
politically motivated included: statements by Board members objecting to anti-
American themes in the books, the absence of any vulgarity in at least one
book (A Reader for Writers), the extraordinary removal procedures that were
employed in lieu of standard policy, and the inclusion of all of the books re-
moved on the PONYU "objectionable" list. See supra notes 1, 3.
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tended to deny students access to ideas with which Board
members disagreed, then the Board would be transgressing
students' rights.11o
The dissenting Justices,"'1 although conceding that the stu-
dents enjoyed first amendment protections at school, concluded
that because the Board was not restricting student expression
the book removal did not infringe upon those rights.112 While
acknowledging that the right to receive information prohibited
the government from creating unreasonable obstacles to the
flow of information,113 that right, according to the dissenters,
did not place an affirmative obligation upon the state to aid
speakers in reaching potential recipients. By choosing not to
retain certain books, the Board was simply making a permissi-
ble decision not to disperse certain information.114 Moreover,
in pursuing the legitimate function of transmitting societal val-
ues, school boards must be permitted to make content-based
110. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2810. Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, explicitly
tried to reconcile the socialization function of schools with the Constitution's
proscription against orthodoxies. He concluded that school officials could at-
tempt to instill certain values "by persuasion and example," or by choice of em-
phasis, but that they could not attempt to shield students from ideas which
they found politically distasteful. Id. at 2816 (quoting West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943)). Thus, Justice Blackmun stated, a
school board could not remove library books for the purpose of restricting ac-
cess to political ideas and social perspectives if the board was motivated simply
by official disapproval of the ideas or perspectives. Id. at 2815.
Justice Blackmun agreed with the plurality that school boards could make
books unavailable if they contained vulgar language. He did not, however, rec-
ognize the library as having any special constitutional significance; it too could
be utilized in the socialization process. Id. at 2814-15. He did note that library
book removals would normally present student plaintiffs with their best oppor-
tunity to establish that a school board was attempting to suppress exposure to
ideas. Id. at 2814 n.1.
Justice White, who constituted the fifth vote for affirmation, concurred in
the result only. He reasoned that a factual record should have been developed
at the trial court before the Supreme Court embarked on any constitutional
pronouncements. Id. at 2816. Some commentators, in fact, have thought it sur-
prising that the Court granted certiorari in Pico in light of the absence of a trial
record. See Comment, supra note 77, at 126 n.211.
111. While joining in Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion, Justices
Rehnquist, Powell, and O'Connor each also wrote separate dissents.
112. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2818 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also supra notes
35-37 and accompanying text (first amendment protection extends to students'
expressive conduct).
113. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2818 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)). Additionally, Jus-
tice Rehnquist argued that the right to receive information applied only when
state action constituted a complete denial of access to the ideas sought. This
was not the case in Pico, he pointed out, because students could still obtain the
books in stores or at the public library. Id. at 2831-32 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
114. Id. at 2818-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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decisions regarding the appropriateness of retaining materials
in the school library or curriculum."15
The Pico dissenters also delineated logical flaws in the plu-
rality decision. Noting the plurality's prohibition against creat-
ing orthodoxies in the classroom, Chief Justice Burger argued
that textbooks, which were required reading, had more poten-
tial for establishing an orthodoxy than library books, which
were optional. The plurality had, however, restricted its ruling
to the latter.1 6 Justice Rehnquist pointed out that if students
did have a right to receive information, then any book removal,
regardless of the motivation behind it, would deny students ac-
cess to ideas and information. 117 In addition, the dissenters
questioned the plurality's distinction between book removal
and selection, because both events had equal potential for sup-
pressing student exposure to ideas." 8 The dissenters' final crit-
icism was that the plurality opinion offered little guidance to
parties involved in subsequent book removal disputes."l9
115. Id. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that none of the right-to-receive-in-
formation cases had dealt with elementary or secondary educational settings.
He also asserted that the library had no special status under a student's right
to receive information, because, unlike a university library, an elementary or
secondary school library was not intended for freewheeling inquiry. Id. at 2832
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist also put forth additional arguments his fellow dissenters
did not make in their opinions. First, he concluded that even under the plural-
ity's "suppression of ideas" standard, the Board's removal was valid, because it
was based on concern for profanity and vulgarity and students could still dis-
cuss the themes of the removed books themselves. Id. at 2828-29. Justice
Rehnquist also argued that in administering the library, the state was acting
not in its role as sovereign, but rather in its role as educator. Pointing to Pick-
ering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), a case involving the state
as an employer, and Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46 (1967), a case involving
the state as property owner, Justice Rehnquist asserted that when the state as-
sumes a role other than sovereign, the first amendment does not apply to its
actions with the same force. In its role as educator, the state was undertaking
to socialize students, a process which inherently entails selecting certain ideas
for presentation over others. While such discrimination would not be proper
for the state as sovereign, it was permissible for the state as educator. Pico, 102
S. Ct. at 2829-30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 2821 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
117. Id. at 2833 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 2821 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 2822-23 (Powell, J., dissenting),
2833 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 2820 (Burger, C.., dissenting). The dissenters characterized "ed-
ucational suitability" as a "standardless phrase," and asserted that a prohibi-
tion against "'political' factors" motivating book removals also provided no
guidance for future cases because "virtually all educational decisions necessar-
ily involve 'political' determinations." Id.
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I. RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN FREE
INQUIRY AND ACCULTURATION
The book removal controversy faced by the Court in Pico
demonstrates that two major constitutionally recognized func-
tions of public education can work at cross-purposes. The
Court has established that public schools may properly incul-
cate students with societal values.120 Clearly, the most efficient
and effective indoctrination of societal values would prevent
students from inquiring into areas of their own choosing. Yet,
the Court has also recognized that students need freedom to in-
quire and to be exposed to a variety of ideas.121 A theoretically
pure marketplace of ideas, however, would preclude the use of
schools as vehicles of socialization. Thus, both objectives can-
not be fully realized. 2 2 While the dissenting Justices in Pico
virtually ignored the goal of open inquiry, the plurality under-
took the difficult task of trying to reconcile the tension between
the inculcating function of public education and the concept of
a free marketplace of ideas. The plurality's balance, however,
does not afford open inquiry the protection it requires.
A. BOOK REMOVAL
1. Freedom of Inquiry
Open inquiry is a necessary component of education in a
self-governing society, in the secondary as well as the collegiate
setting. 23 Participation in the free marketplace of ideas cannot
120. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
122. See Comment, Removing Books from School Libraries, 96 HARv. L.
R y. 151, 160 (1982).
123. Professor Emerson states:
Ultimately any system of freedom of expression depends upon the
existence of an educated, independent, mature citizenry. Conse-
quently realization of the objectives of the First Amendment requires
educational institutions that produce graduates who are trained in han-
dling ideas, judging facts and argument, thinking independently, and
generally participating effectively in the marketplace of ideas. Hence
the First Amendment could be said to require the kind of educational
institutions that are capable of producing such results.
EMERSON, supra note 26, at 613. See also supra notes 26-32, 56-62, and accompa-
nying text. Speaking on the role of teachers from the primary grades to the
universities, the Court stated that their task is "to foster those habits of open-
mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens,
who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective public opinion." Wei-
man v. Updegraff; 344 U.S. 183, 195-97 (1952). See also Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968).
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be postponed, as Justice Rehnquist implies, 24 until a student
matriculates. Not everyone partakes of post-secondary educa-
tion, but those who do not are still fullfledged members of soci-
ety who need and deserve the skills necessary to participate in
self-government. Even a college education does not guarantee
independent thought: students who attend a university may
never be able to think independently if they received a thor-
ough indoctrination at the secondary school level.
Some courts, 25 unlike the Pico dissenters, at least recog-
nize that open inquiry is a laudable goal in secondary schools
but argue that it must nevertheless be limited. They reason
that secondary students lack the intellectual ability to effec-
tively evaluate ideas, a skill necessary for meaningful participa-
tion in the free marketplace of ideas.126 Accordingly, school
boards and educational professionals, who are better able to
evaluate ideas, need to offer students direction and guidance,
which includes determining what books will be available in the
library.127 This position, however, underestimates students'
abilities. As one federal judge stated: "Today's high school stu-
dents are surprisingly sophisticated, intelligent, and discerning.
They are far from easy prey for even the most forcefully ex-
pressed, cogent, and persuasive words.U28 Moreover, no book
would even appear on a library shelf unless a school official
(perhaps a prior board or more likely a librarian) had previ-
ously determined that the books had some educational
value.129
124. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2832 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). No dissenter even
acknowledged that freedom of inquiry and the free marketplace of ideas are
laudable goals in a secondary school setting. Not once did a dissenter deal with
or even mention the famous passage in Tinker stating that junior and senior
high school students needed exposure to a wide variety of ideas. See Tinker,
393 U.S. at 511.
125. See, e.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th
Cir. 1980). See also supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
126. Justice Stewart noted: "[A] child . . . [does not possess the] full ca-
pacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment
guarantees." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515; (Stewart, J., concurring). See supra notes
89-90 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 86, at 154.
127. Zykan, 631 F.2d at 1304.
128. Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1368 (D. Or. 1976) (voiding a
school board order preventing the appearance of outside political speakers).
Additionally, the American Library Association (A.L.A.) declares in its Library
Bill of Rights that patrons of all ages should have unfettered access to all li-
brary material. American Library Association, Library Bill of Rights art. 5
(1948, amended 1980). The Library Bill of Rights, however, is an embodiment
of A.LA. positions and does not have binding legal effect.
129. It is very unlikely that a librarian would ever select a work which was
even arguably "obscene." Comment, supra note 1, at 765 n.105. See generally
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The plurality in Pico thus took a positive step in promoting
freedom of inquiry by recognizing that the right to receive in-
formation through reading applies to secondary school stu-
dents. As one commentator stated, "[J] udicial recognition of a
right to read [school library books is] consistent with the pur-
poses and premises of the first amendment,"130 it being mean-
ingless to protect only expression of ideas without protecting
the receipt of those ideas as well.13' The Pico dissenters cor-
rectly noted that the Court had never before applied this right
to students in public schools. Yet, in Tinker, the Court had de-
clared that students are entitled to full enjoyment of their first
amendment rights as long as their exercise of such rights does
not threaten school discipline, disrupt school activities, or in-
fringe upon the rights of others.13 2 Accordingly, students must
be permitted to enjoy the "well established"133 right to receive
information unless their use of that right transgresses the
Tinker limitations. A student's exercise of his or her right to
read in the library does not, of itself, threaten school discipline
or disrupt school activities. Nor does a reader infringe upon
the rights of others by subjecting a captive audience to material
they find offensive: only those who seek out a work will be ex-
posed to it.134
Coupled with the Pico plurality's recognition of the right to
receive information in a school setting is its recognition of the
special status of the school library.13 Perhaps Justice Rehn-
quist is correct in stating that little precedent exists for grant-
ing school libraries special constitutional status,136 but "[a]
library is a mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas. It
is specially dedicated to broad dissemination of ideas." 37 A li-
brary is therefore the focal point for freedom of inquiry within
supra note 72 and infra note 208 (discussion of obscenity standards and school
library collections).
130. O'Neil, supra note 82, at 222.
131. Id.
132. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. See also supra notes 35-37 and accompanying
text (a student's right to receive information must be applied in light of the
special educational environment).
133. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
134. See Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D.N.H.
1979). See also supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text; Comment, supra note
77, at 134.
135. A majority of the Court did not recognize this status. Justice Black-
mun agreed with the dissenters that schools may also use the library to incul-
cate. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2814 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 2832 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra note 115.
137. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir.
1976) (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
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a school.138 As the plurality opinion pointed out, in the library
"a student can literally explore the unknown and discover ar-
eas of interest and thought not covered by the prescribed cur-
riculum.... Th[e] student learns that a library is a place to
test or expand upon ideas presented to him, in or out of the
classroom." 3 9 Thus, by providing a haven for open inquiry
amidst an array of socializing forces, the library offers a reason-
able solution' 40 to the problem of striking a balance between
the school's inculcating function and the free marketplace of
ideas.
'Nevertheless, the Pico dissenters argued that a student's
right to receive information still should not limit school offi-
cials' discretion in removing library books. Chief Justice Bur-
ger did correctly state that a student's right to receive
information does not place an affirmative obligation on the
school to provide particular books in the library.14' The Court
has held, however, that once the state voluntarily chooses to
provide a benefit it cannot subsequently deny or place condi-
tions on the use of that benefit in a manner which impinges
upon a patron's first amendment rights unless the state can
demonstrate that some compelling state interest necessitates
the restrictions. 42 Thus, once a school board voluntarily pro-
vides the benefit of a library, it cannot subsequently place re-
strictions on the library's use that violate a patron's
constitutional rights.143
An unshelving implicates the right to receive information
because the state is hindering access to information previously:
available. Such a hindrance is impermissible unless it can be
justified in terms of some compelling state interest. 4 4 More-
ing) and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969)).
138. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2809. See also O'Neil, supra note 82, at 246; supra
note 108.
139. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2809 (quoting Right to Read Defense Comm. v.
School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715 (1978)). See also O'Neil, supra note 82, at
246; supra note 108.
140. See Comment, supra note 1, at 770.
141. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
142. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963) and cases cited
therein.
143. Minarcini, 541 F.2d at 582. Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 358 (1962)
(while the state does not have to provide for appeals as a matter of right, hav-
ing chosen to do so, it must also provide indigents with counsel for their
appeals).
144. For example, in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), re-
quiring an addressee to fill out a return card before obtaining mail was held an
impermissible hindrance on the addressee's right to receive information. Of
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over, that the same books are available outside of the school
does not save an otherwise unconstitutional removal. In Vir-
ginia State Board, the Court declared that the state could not
restrict the right to receive information simply because the re-
cipients could obtain the same message from another source.145
The Court further held that recipients' rights do not depend on
the rights of senders; a student's right to receive information
exists irrespective of whether authors and publishers have a
right to have their works placed in the school library.146
The Pico plurality's reliance upon the right to receive infor-
mation was, therefore, an -appropriate choice in light of its own
precedent.147 Unfortunately, the opinion qualified a student's
right to read books found in the school library by holding that
only those book removals motivated by school board dislike for
the ideas contained in those works would violate the student's
course, the government never had an obligation to provide a postal service, but
once having done so it could not then transgress upon an addressee's rights.
See TRIBE, supra note 77, at 675 n.5. For a discussion of the state's interest in
book removal, see infra notes 151-81 and accompanying text.
145. The Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), unequivocally declared that alterna-
tive methods for obtaining information are irrelevant in determining whether
an individual's right to receive information has been violated. Id. at 757 n.15.
See Harpez, supra note 100, at 47. Consequently, Justice Rehnquist is wrong
when he states that right-to-receive cases only involved relatively complete de-
nials of access. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2831-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Even so,
in some circumstances a board's removal of a library book may for all practical
purposes be a complete denial of access. Students may be unable to purchase
the books or to travel to public libraries during their often limited hours of
business. One of the plaintiffs in Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp.
1269 (D.N.H. 1979), encountered this difficulty. See id. at 1275 n.5.
Justice Rehnquist also argued that a school's special status made the right
to receive information totally inappropriate in the public educational setting.
Merely declaring that in secondary schools the state is assuming the role of ed-
ucator instead of sovereign, however, does not provide an adequate basis for a
board's denying students their right to receive information. The Court has ex-
plicitly stated that junior and senior high school students enjoy first amend-
ment rights. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 493
U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
146. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756-57. In addition, the ad-
dressees in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), had a right to
receive their mail even though the foreign senders of that mail had no guaran-
teed right to use the United States postal system. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., con-
curring). See also TamE, supra note 77, at 674-78.
147. The concept of academic freedom perhaps could have been equally as
effective a tool, but that doctrine is considerably less developed and more
amorphous than the right to receive information. See supra notes 51-62 and ac-
companying text. Perhaps the plurality feared that if it employed the concept
of academic freedom its decision would have implications beyond the specific
issue of book removal. The plurality took special care in limiting its holding to
the book removal issue. See Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2805.
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right. 4 8 The Court could have reached this same result by sim-
ply resting upon Barnette's proscription of state-prescribed
orthodoxies. As Justice Rehnquist stated, a book removal, mo-
tivated by whatever reason, necessarily denies students access
to the ideas it contains.149 Therefore, even when school officials
are not motivated by a desire to prescribe an orthodoxy, a book
removal should still constitute a violation of a student's right to
receive information absent a compelling state interest. The
state regulation in Virginia State Board, for example, had the
legitimate purpose of maintaining high standards of profession-
alism. The Court nonetheless concluded that this was not a
sufficient justification for infringing upon a consumer's right to
receive information, especially since the state had alternative
means of achieving their goal.150 The reasons school officials
offer for removing books also must be examined in this light.
2. Acculturation
In removing library books, school officials sometimes claim
they are carrying out their community's will regarding appro-
priate values to transmit to students.' 5 ' The Pico dissenters
would accept that premise as sufficient justification for virtually
all library book removals. 52 This position, however, ignores
the very real possibility of local majorities being insensitive, if
not hostile, to individual rights and the right to inquire into be-
liefs contrary to their own.153 Thus, a board could well be ade-
148. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2812. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
149. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2833 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Of course, motiva-
tion-based tests are nothing new for the judiciary. See Mount Healthy City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977) (the Board could
have fired an untenured teacher for no reason at all, but if the decision not to
rehire him was in retaliation for his exercising first amendment rights the
Board had run afoul of the Constitution); Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S.
733 (1949) (court required to determine whether taxpayers truly intended to
form a partnership). 'Triers of fact are constantly called upon to determine the
intent with which a person acted." Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 743. Nevertheless,
Justice Rehnquist is correct when he states that "[b]ad motives and good mo-
tives alike deny access to the books removed." Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2833 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
150. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 766-70.
151. See supra note 3. See generally supra notes 15-17 and accompanying
text.
152. See Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2822 (Powell, J., dissenting), 2832 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
153. A sampling of some of the reknowned books which educators have
banned, or have attempted to ban, is one indication of this insensitivity: 1984
by G. Orwell, Brave New World by A. Huxley, The Catcher in the Rye by J.D.
Salinger, Of Mice and Men by J. Steinbeck, The Merchant of Venice by Shake-
speare, The Adventures of Tom Sawyer and The Adventures of Huckleberry
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quately representing the majority of its constituency when it
transgresses upon a student's constitutional rights. As the Pico
plurality pointed out, one of the major goals of the Bill of
Rights is precisely to protect individuals from the tyranny of
the majority: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to with-
draw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political contro-
versy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials ... ."154
Moreover, restrictions upon school officials' ability to re-
move library books will not seriously obstruct their efforts to
socialize students because they have ample opportunity to do
so through other means. School officials would continue to de-
termine which courses would be taught and which textbooks
would be used. Since both these determinations involve re-
quired activities, they are much more powerful tools for incul-
cating students than are the optional readings of the library.155
Employing the curriculum to foster societal values, if not
abused,156 is constitutionally legitimate under Barnette's pro-
nouncement that school officials can instill values by "persua-
sion and example."15 7 Library book removal, on the other
hand, is not an instance of teaching by "persuasion and
example."
Nor is it necessary for school officials to remove library
books in order to prevent students from inferring school ap-
proval of the books and their contents. Chief Justice Burger
correctly stated that schools should not be forced to endorse
ideas of which they disapprove,15 8 but the mere presence of a
book in a school library does not imply state approval. Even
some who offer the implication of state approval as a justifica-
tion for book removal concede that library books project less of
an aura of state endorsement than do required readings.159
Moreover, if libraries actually approved of all their holdings,
few American libraries would contain Mein Kampf or The Corn-
Finn by Mark Twain, The Sun Also Rises by E. Hemingway, Black Like Me by
J.H. Griffins, and Citizen Tom Paine by H. Fast. See Niccolai, supra note 63, at
34 n.53; Comment, supra note 77, at 106 n.55.
154. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
Justice Blackmun cited this passage in his concurrence. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2816.
155. Cf. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2821 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Students spend 75
percent of their class time, and 90 percent of their homework time, on assigned
textbook materials. P. GoLDsTEiN, CHANGING THE AMERICAN SCHOOLBOOK
LAw, PoLTcs AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (1978).
156. See supra note 71.
157. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640. See supra note 110.
158. See Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2820 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
159. See Nocera, supra note 11, at 23.
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munist Manifesto.160 Finally, to remove any doubt, a school
board could publicize, as some already do, that it does not en-
dorse the ideas contained in its library books.161
Even if school officials were correct in their claim that im-
pairment of their ability to remove library books would hinder
the socialization process,162 the result in book removal cases
should be the same. The Court has repeatedly placed limits on
the power of schools to indoctrinate students,163 especially
when this power runs afoul of preferred first amendment val-
ues.1 6 In addition, while numerous institutions help to incul-
cate societal values (church and family are two examples),
very few help to promote independent thinking. Consequently,
if one of these two conflicting goals of public education must
yield ground, it should be the inculcating function.
Of course, if the books which a school board sought to re-
move were constitutionally "obscene" under Miller, first
amendment protections would not apply. No school board has
yet asserted, however, that a removed work met the Miller
test,165 nor have any of the challenged books constituted "ob-
scenity" under the broader Ginsberg standard for minors, be-
cause the books' appeal to prurient interests have not been
sufficiently strong.166
In Pico, Chief Justice Burger contended that isolated vul-
160. Comment, supra note 1, at 764 n.100.
161. The American Library Association states: "Libraries do not advocate
the ideas found in their collections." American Library Association, Statement
on Labeling, An Interpretation of the Library Bill of Rights (1951, amended
1981). See supra note 128. The Minneapolis Public Schools System, for exam-
ple, states in its selection guidelines that "[the inclusion of controversial ma-
terial [in learning materials] does not imply endorsement of the ideas by
Minneapolis school personnel." Minneapolis Public Schools, Selection of
Learning Materials-General Guidelines 6411 B (rev. Feb. 23, 1976).
162. While the plurality continued to recognize the legitimacy of the accul-
turation function of schools, Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2806, the public school as an in-
culcator of societal values is not without its critics. See, e.g., G. DENNISON, THE
LIVES OF CHILDREN (1969); J. FARBER, THE STUDENT AS NIGGER (1969); P. GOOD-
MAN, GROWING UP ABSURD (1960); J. HENRY, CULTURE AGAINST MAN (1963); J.
HERNDON, THE WAY IT SPOZED To BE (1968); J. HOLT, How CHILDREN FAIL
(1964); L ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY (1971); H. KOHL, 36 CHILDREN (1967); A.
NEILL, SUMMERHILL (1960); N. PAsTMAN & C. WEINGARTNER, TEACHING AS A SUB-
VERSrVE ACTVITrY (1969); RADICAL SCHOOL REFORM (B. Gross & R. Gross eds.
1970); C. SILBERIAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM (1970). See Comment, supra
note 1, at 766 n.113.
163. See supra notes 18-25, 62, and accompanying text.
164. "Freedom of... speech... [is] in a preferred position." Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
165. See supra note 72.
166. If a librarian did happen to select a truly obscene work, the school
board could, of course, subsequently remove it. See supra note 72. See also
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garity was a sufficient justification for a library book removal. 167
His reliance upon FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 168 is not persua-
sive, though, because that case expressed concern over inva-
sion of the privacy of the home by unsolicited vulgarity, a
concern which is not present in a library setting.169 Concern
for the privacy rights of fellow students likewise does not jus-
tify a book removal because, as stated previously, only those
students who seek out a work will be exposed to it.170 More-
over, the Chief Justice's position ignores an earlier Court's re-
jection of "the facile assumption that one can forbid particular
words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing
ideas in the process."' 71 Objections to indecent language may
be pretexts for hostility to unpopular ideas, 7 2 and the first
Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 409 U.S. 998, 1000
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting to denial of cert.).
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the leading case allowing stricter
regulation of obscenity when dealing with children, involved the sale of a
"girlie" magazine (one containing photographs of naked women). The books
typically involved in removal cases do not have any such photographs. While it
is true that the Court has declared that even a book containing no pictures can
be constitutionally obscene, see Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973),
only once since Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), which set forth the
modern obscenity standard that is basically retained in Miller, has the Court
declared a book obscene. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). In fact,
most of the books in Mishkin were illustrated and their appeal to prurient in-
terest intense. See id. at 505. In comparison, the challenged works in public
school libraries are much too tame to qualify as "obscene" even under Gins-
berg. Interview with Robert C. McClure, Professor of Law, University of Min-
nesota Law School, in Minneapolis, Minnesota (Aug. 29, 1983). See supra note
69. Another indication of Ginsberg's inapplicability is that neither it nor
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), another obscenity case,
were even cited by the dissenters in Pico.
167. Chief Justice Burger assailed the plurality for requiring a school board
to be concerned with "pervasive vulgarity" in order to justify a book removal.
Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2820 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
168. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
169. See Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703,
715 n.10 (D. Mass. 1978). Pacifica Foundation has been strongly criticized. See
supra note 77.
Justice Brandeis's comments in a case upholding the regulation of outdoor
advertising indicate that he too would have denounced Pacifica Foundation as
failing to distinguish between intrusive and nonintrusive modes of communi-
cation: "The radio can be turned off, but not so the billboard." Packer Corp. v.
Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932).
170. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. Cf. Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 44 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("no one is being compelled to look
at [offensive materials]").
171. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (reversing breach of peace
conviction of courtroom spectator who wore a jacket stating: "Fuck the Draft").
172. The Island Trees Board learned this lesson, although too late. "Over
the course of the fight, the Board ... learned not to emphasize its political con-
cerns and to play instead its obscenity card, which was much safer in court."
Nocera, supra note 11, at 24.
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amendment cannot tolerate such a convenient guise for ban-
ning expression. 7 3
The plurality's allowance for book removals motivated by
"pervasive vulgarity" perhaps may help insure that concern for
vulgarity truly prompted the action, but such a removal would
still violate the constitutional proscription against "cleans [ing]
public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable
to the most squeamish among us."'174 Students need access to
a wide variety of books, even those fairly characterized as "per-
vasively vulgar," to assure exposure to a vigorous presentation
of various viewpoints. 75 Claims that students are still able to
discuss the content of removed books76 are unavailing because
only through exposure to the most direct and forceful expres-
sion of a position will students be able to meaningfully partici-
pate in the free marketplace of ideas.177
Moreover, no harm to students resulting from exposure to
vulgar language has been demonstrated; in fact, substantial evi-
dence exists that such exposure has no lasting effects on either
adolescents or adults. 78 One circuit court has stated that if
173. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
174. Id. at 25. Moreover, "it is nevertheless often true that one man's vul-
garity is another's lyric." Id. The Minneapolis Public Schools' materials selec-
tion policy states: 'The use of offensive language or frankness in dealing with
sex should not preclude titles [from selection] if they contribute to the accu-
racy of the character portrayal and assist in expanding the reader's attitudes."
Minneapolis Public Schools, Selection of Learning Materials-General Guide-
lines 6411 B (rev. Feb. 23, 1976).
175. "Books communicate ideas, more permanently and often more persua-
sively than any other form of expression." Pico, 638 F.2d at 432 (Newman, J.,
concurring). In addition, "[wiords are often chosen as much for their emotive
as their cognitive force," and the Constitution protects the former use as well
as the latter. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
176. See, e.g., Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
177. Speaking of "all who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth,"
John Stuart Mill declared:
Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from
his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by
what they offer as refutations. That is not the way to do justice to the
arguments or bring them into real contact with his own mind. He must
be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them, who de-
fend them in earnest and do their very utmost for them. He must know
them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must feel the
whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to
encounter and dispose of; else he will never really possess himself of
the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty.
J.S. MnL, ON LMIERTY 46-47 (The World's Classics ed. 1912) (1st ed. London,
1859).
178. A government study, chaired by William B. Lockhart, Dean of the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School, concluded that "[i]f a case is to be made
against 'pornography' . . . it will have to be made on grounds other than
demonstrated effects of a damaging personal or social nature." CoimnssIoN ON
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students truly need protection from contact with four-letter
words, then the court "would fear for their future."179 Espe-
cially sensitive students can avoid library books which they
might find offensive; and librarians are available to aid them in
their selection process. 180
Admittedly, the possibility exists that students would mis-
use information obtained from certain books, but the first
amendment dictates accepting that risk when faced with the
OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY
AND PORNOGRAPHY 139 (1970). The study dealt with the effects of exposure not
only to sexually-oriented textual materials, but also to films, photographs, and
sexual devices, id. at 3 n.4, materials commonly considered more erotically
stimulating than books. In addition to independent research, the Commission
examined popular and scientific literature and concluded that "[e]mpirical re-
search ... has found no reliable evidence to date that exposure to explicit
sexual materials plays a significant role in the causation of delinquent or crimi-
nal sexual behavior among youth or adults." Id. at 139. The Commission found
that delinquent and nondelinquent youths had similar exposure to sexually ex-
plicit materials and that sex offenders actually had less adolescent exposure to
erotica than did other adults. Id. at 26-27. In addition, exposure to sexually-ori-
ented materials did not appear to substantially change individual's sexual be-
havior, attitudes about sexuality, or views concerning sexual morality. Id. at
25-26. One cited study concluded that while home background and peer influ-
ence were statistically related to "moral character," no such relationship be-
tween exposure to sexually-oriented materials and moral character could be
established. Id. at 202. See also supra note 99 and accompanying text. The Re-
port, however, does have its critics. See, e.g., Diamond, Pornography and Re-
pression: A Reconsideration of "Who" and "What" in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT
187 (L. Lederer ed. 1980).
179. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (Ist Cir. 1969) (granting a tempo-
rary injunction to stop teacher dismissal proceedings commenced in response
to the teacher's classroom use of an article which contained the word
"motherfucker"). The court continued, "We do not question the good faith of
the [school officials] in believing that some parents have been offended. With
the greatest respect to such parents, their sensibilities are not the full measure
of what is proper education." Id. at 361-62.
180. In addition, some schools allow parents to inform officials that their
child should not be allowed to read a certain work. The St. Paul Public
Schools, for example, provide: "No child will be prevented from reading or
viewing any school materials in which he has interest. However, reasonable ef-
forts will be made to comply with requests from parents that certain materials
be withheld from their children." St. Paul Public Schools, Instructional Materi-
als Selection Procedures 3 (1975).
None of the student challenges to public school library book removals have
involved a conflict between students and their parents. A school following a pa-
rental request not to let their child read a certain work might, however, violate
that student's right to receive information. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
242 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (if children possess sufficient maturity, they
should be able to attend high school, if they so desire, over the otherwise valid
objections of their parents). Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662 (1979), and Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), are also analogous, both
holding, inter alia, that states can not require parental consent before allowing
a minor to obtain an abortion.
[Vol. 68:213
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
danger of suppressing ideas.181 Of course, if school officials
could demonstrate that a certain work posed a real threat of
emotional or psychological harm to student readers,182 then the
removal would be constitutionally justified by a compelling
state interest.183
3. Striking the Proper Balance
The overwhelming majority of reasons school boards offer
to justify book removals are not sufficiently compelling to war-
rant interference with a student's right to receive information.
Schools have ample opportunity to inculcate students without
impinging on first amendment rights. Thus, while a school
board can legitimately avoid emphasizing a work by not requir-
ing its reading,184 it should not be permitted to purge the book
from its library. Consequently, the Pico plurality's position
limiting a school's power to inculcate is superior to the dissent-
ers' view that the acculturation function should have virtual
free reign.
Even the plurality, however, failed to recognize that a
school board should be allowed to remove a library book only
in extraordinary circumstances. Presumably, a book has al-
ready passed the test of "educational suitability" once it has
made its way into the school library.185 Such a work deserves a
status analogous to tenure, which would assure that officials
could not subsequently limit students' access to a diversity of
ideas by removing the work.' 86 The risk that occasionally a
truly "unsuitable" work would be on the library shelves is out-
181. See Virginia State Ed. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
182. The Second Circuit has explicitly rejected this standard. Bicknell v.
Vergennes Union High School Ed. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438, 441 n.4 (2d Cir.
1980). For an example of a sufficient showing of potential psychological and
emotional harm, see Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 517-19 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). In Trachtman, the court upheld the school's
ban on distribution of a survey inquiring about students' sexual habits. All stu-
dents would have received a questionnaire, which is distinguishable from a stu-
dent seeking out a work in the library.
183. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509-10 (1951) ("Speech is not
an absolute above and beyond control by the legislature, when its judgment,
subject to review here, is that certain kinds of speech are so undesirable as to
warrant... sanctions.").
184. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2815 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
185. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
186. Two courts, however, have rejected the argument that books obtain a
status similar to tenure. See Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School
Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Zykan v.
Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1308 (7th Cir. 1980). For a
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weighed by the risk to students' freedom of inquiry if school of-
ficials had substantial discretion in removing library books.
Nor should objections to "pervasive vulgarity" provide justifica-
tion for book removals; not only does that standard offer a con-
venient pretext for ideologically motivated school officials, it
also allows for an impermissible "cleansing" of first amend-
ment interaction.187
To adequately protect the free marketplace of ideas, a stan-
dard that is much more stringent and much less ambiguous' 88
than the Pico holding is necessary. Accordingly, any unshelv-
ing of a public school library book should constitute a prima fa-
cie violation of a student's right to receive information. Under
such a standard, the school board would have the burden of
justifying any removal in terms of the narrow grounds Tinker
set forth as warranting an abridgment of student rights. The
board would have to show that a student reading the work
would interfere with the rights of others or substantially dis-
description of the purposes of tenure in a university setting, see EMERSON,
supra note 26, at 595.
187. See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
188. The dissenters are correct in assailing the plurality for offering little
guidance to the parties involved. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
One commentator has stated that before the Supreme Court's Pico decision,
the law on school board book removals was "so varied that [it was] murky,"
and that the Pico ruling itself "does little to clear up the confusion." Nocera,
supra note 11, at 20. See also Note, supra note 100, at 469 (citing Address by
Robert M. O'Neil, University of Illinois Conference on Schools and the Consti-
tution, The First Amendment in the Library and the Classroom-Recent Devel-
opments (July 28, 1982)). Consequently, the issues raised by Pico are not
likely to quietly vanish. Incidents of library book removals usually ebb and
flow with the political tides of the nation, with the number of incidents gener-
ally increasing as the mood of the country becomes more conservative. See id.
at 463. Not surprisingly, the number of book removals has risen recently. One
indicator of this increase is the number of reported book banning incidents re-
ceived by the Office of Intellectual Freedom of the American Library Associa-
tion. Judith Krug, head of the Office of Intellectual Freedom, states that in the
1970s that figure rose from 100 to 300 per year, while by 1981 one thousand inci-
dents were being reported annually. Nocera, supra note 11, at 22. Another ba-
rometer is a recent Minnesota Civil Liberties Union study indicating that 212 of
the nearly 500 public schools and libraries that responded to the questionnaire
reported challenges to books, films, and records. Minnesota Daily, Jan. 24, 1983,
at 3. The plurality ruling in Pico will probably not deter school boards who are
convinced that they should remove certain books from their libraries, although
the ruling should cause a change in tactics. See generally supra notes 3, 172,
and accompanying text (tactics and attitudes of school boards in previous
cases). School boards seeking to ban books in the future likely will not voice
political and ideological objections to the texts. Instead, boards will take care
to complain only of a lack of "educational suitability" or of "pervasive vulgar-
ity." See Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2810. In addition, school boards will probably use
established procedures for handling book challenges instead of creating ad hoc
measures as did the Island Trees Board.
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rupt school discipline or classwork1 89 As in Tinker, an "undif-
ferentiated fear or apprehension of a disturbance [would] not
[be] enough to overcome the right" to first amendment free-
doms.190 Rarely would a school board be able to meet this
stringent standard, especially since reading library books is
usually a voluntary and tranquil activity.191 Alternatively, if a
school board could demonstrate that a certain library book
threatened to cause psychological or emotional harm to student
readers, then the board could also justifiably remove the book.
Only these specific justifications are sufficiently compelling to
warrant unshelving a library book.
The standard set forth in this Comment does not depend
upon the particular motivation of school officials. Even book
removals that are not ideologically motivated would be invalid
unless the school board could establish one of the narrow justi-
fications for removal. For example, if a school board's sincere
concern about discipline prompted it to unshelve a library
book, it would still have to demonstrate that the work actually
posed a material threat to discipline.192 This formulation is
much less vague than the Pico plurality opinion.193 It would
unambiguously put school officials on notice that they could
rarely remove a book from their libraries, especially if the un-
shelving is justifiable only as a response to parental outrage.
B. BOOK SELECTION
1. Distinctions Between Book Removal and Selection
Usually, book selection is less controversial than book re-
moval,l94 although book selection also has first amendment im-
plications. Some courts, as illustrated by the Presidents
Council and Zykan decisions, have viewed book selection and
removal as indistinguishable, both procedures being encom-
passed under a school board's authority to maintain the library
189. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
190. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09
(1969), cited with approval in Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2807.
191. See supra notes 108, 132-34, and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. Prohibiting book unshelv-
ings regardless of motive eliminates the problem of school officials seeking to
disguise ideologically based book removals by only voicing objections to vulgar-
ity. See supra notes 172-77, 188, and accompanying text. Of course, any book
removal that would be impermissible under the Pico plurality's holding would
be impermissible under the more stringent standards suggested by this
Comment.
193. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
194. Cf. Harpez, supra note 100, at 93-94.
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collection it deems proper.195 These courts have considered the
library to be merely an auxiliary to the classroom.1 96 Other
courts, however, have drawn a distinction between book selec-
tion and removal. While acknowledging that a school board is
not obligated to select particular works, those courts restrict a
school board's ability to remove existing library books.197
These courts accord the school library a special status beyond
that of mere adjunct to the prescribed curriculum.
The Pico plurality opinion embraced this latter view.
While recognizing the library's special status in the market-
place of ideas, the plurality carefully pointed out that its deci-
sion did not speak to the issue of book acquisitions. The
dissenters in Pico correctly observed, however, that school offi-
cials can employ the book selection process as well as book re-
movals to officially suppress certain ideas.198 The answer to the
dissent is to go beyond the plurality's holding and allow stu-
dent plaintiffs a cause of action in both instances.
Student challenges to school library acquisitions, though,
have a somewhat different theoretical basis than do book re-
moval challenges. Clearly, both failure to select and removal
prevent a student from reading that particular work in the
school library. Banishing a book already in place, however, is
more hostile to the first amendment because it dramatically
communicates official disapproval of the condemned work in a
way that failing to select a book normally does not. Hence, a
greater "chilling" effect results from a book removal.199 More-
over, the right to receive information, upon which the book re-
moval challenge in Pico was based, is not precisely applicable
to book selection. While that right prohibits the state from hin-
dering an individual's access to information, it does not saddle
195. Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d
289, 293 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Zykan v. Warsaw Community
School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1308 (7th Cir. 1980). The Zykan court, though, did
state that a school board could not stock the library so that it would reflect only
one perspective. 631 F.2d at 1308. See also Pico, 638 F.2d at 431 (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
196. Presidents Counci4 638 F.2d at 292; Zykan, 631 F.2d at 1308.
197. See, e.g., Pico, 638 F.2d at 435-36 (Newman, J., concurring); Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976); Salvail v. Nashua
Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense
Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 712 (D. Mass. 1978).
198. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2821 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 2822-23 (Powell, J.,
dissenting), 2833 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, a book removal
standard, even by itself, would greatly contribute to the diversity of a library
collection. See infra text accompanying notes 203-04.
199. See supra note 86 at 154-55. See also Pico, 638 F.2d at 434 (Newman, J.,
concurring).
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the government with an affirmative obligation to provide partic-
ular information.200 As Chief Justice Burger noted, if a school
rejects a work at the selection stage, it simply fails to affirma-
tively provide access to the- ideas contained within.201 The
Chief Justice failed to recognize, however, that by removing a
library book, a school board is affirmatively denying access to
ideas which had been readily available.202
2. Establishing a Constitutional Standard for Book Selection
As a matter of sound educational policy, schools should
strive to acquire a library collection containing a "balanced
presentation of ideas."203 The book removal standard that this
Comment advocates would greatly add to the diversity of li-
brary collections. School boards of different ideologies could
select works previously ignored, knowing that subsequent
boards could not unshelve their selections. The inability to re-
200. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
201. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2819 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
202. In fact, alternative sources of access may not be available to students.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text; Harpez, supra note 100, at 48-49.
203. At least one commentator has suggested that a balanced presentation
in library materials should be constitutionally mandated. See Niccolai, supra
note 63, at 31.
The Library Bill of Rights states: "Libraries should provide materials and
information presenting all points of view on current and historical issues.
Materials should not be proscribed or removed because of partisan or doctrinal
disapproval." Library Bill of Rights art. 2 (1948, amended 1980).
The Minneapolis Public Schools, for example, state:
The student's right to learn must be recognized and protected by a se-
lection policy which provides a wide diversity of materials.
Materials which present various interpretations of controversial
subjects should be readily accessible.
... [C]are must be taken to represent the many sides of public
opinion. Examples of propaganda and extremist viewpoints should be
provided to enable students to assess conflicting views.
Minneapolis Public Schools, Selection of Learning Materials--General Guide-
lines 6411 B (rev. Feb. 23, 1976).
Also illustrative is the declaration of the St. Paul Public Schools:
Access to large and varied collections of materials is essential to pro-
grams which provide students with independent study time.
... Because the curriculum may not include items of personal rel-
evance to students, access to a wide range of supplemental materials is
essential.
If a controversial issue is covered at all in the curriculum or in the
library, materials representing all sides of that issue ire to be included.
St. Paul Public Schools, Instructional Materials Selection Procedures 1-2
(1975). For two additional enlightened library selection policies, see Comment,
supra note 1, at 751 n.24 and 756 n.50.
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move a previous school board's selections would, over time,
yield a diverse library collection.
The right to receive information, however, does not em-
power courts to order school officials to purchase specific
works. Nevertheless, the first amendment does require certain
minimum standards for the book selection process: school offi-
cials cannot stock their libraries with books of only one point of
view or exclude any particular view because such efforts violate
the first amendment's proscription of officially prescribed
orthodoxies.204
The constitutional proscription of orthodoxy gives students
the right to challenge book acquisitions, as the right to receive
information test allows challenges to book removals. As stated
above, the book removal standard does not require examina-
tion of school officials' motivations because it is based on the
right to receive information.2 05 Unlike the book removal stan-
dard, however, the book selection standard would consider the
motivation of school officials. Motivation is a factor because the
book selection standard is founded on the proscription of
orthodoxies and, as the plurality in Pico noted, intent is neces-
sary to establish an orthodoxy.206
Such an intent requirement inevitably places a formidable
burden of proof on plaintiffs challenging book selection deci-
sions; establishing that school officials acted with an impermis-
sible motive will often be extremely difficult.207 Schools
204. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 622, 642 (1943).
205. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text; Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2810.
207. Procedural safeguards and selection standards would make plaintiffs'
task easier. In addition to helping prevent abuse in selecting materials initially,
these directives would provide a record that a court could subsequently ex-
amine. See Niccolai, supra note 63, at 36-37.
The American Association of School Librarians, for example, acknowledges
that the local school board is "legally responsible for all matters relating to the
operation of the school district," but urges that "[t]he responsibility for the se-
lection of instructional materials ... should be delegated to the certificated li-
brary/media personnel employed by the school district." Such personnel
would then coordinate material selection with "teachers, students, supervisors,
administrators, and community persons." Policies and Procedures for Selection
of Instructional Materials, ScH. MEDIA Q., Winter 1977, at 109, 110.
The American Library Association (A.L.) spells out specific criteria to
guide school systems in resource selection. The A.LA. states that the following
criteria should be used.
a. educational significance
b. contribution the subject matter makes to the curriculum and to the
interests of the students
c. favorable reviews found in standard selection sources
d. favorable recommendations based on preview and examination of
materials by professional personnel
[Vol. 68:213
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
obviously do not have the resources to purchase unlimited
quantities of library books, and officials cannot help but reflect
personal preferences and moral convictions in their decision to
purchase one work over another. Many non-ideological and ob-
jective reasons may also underlie such a choice. School offi-
cials may base book selection on the need for books dealing
with certain subjects, quality of writing style, or even cost.
Consequently, an isolated incident of a school official passing
over a particular book would probably be insufficient to estab-
lish a violation of the prohibition against prescribing orthodox-
ies. To prove the requisite motivation, plaintiffs would
generally have to show a pattern of behavior such as school of-
ficials continually bypassing a particular viewpoint without any
justification based on selection criteria unrelated to ideology.
Although removal of and failure to select a book both result
in the work's absence from a school library, challenges to each
are based upon different constitutional theories. Book remov-
als can be challenged as violating the right to receive informa-
tion; book selections must instead be challenged as violating
the ban on prescribing orthodoxies. The practical result of this
e. reputation and significance of the author, producer and publisher
f. validity, up-to-dateness, and appropriateness of material
g. contribution the material makes to breadth of representative view-
points on controversial issues
h. high degree of potential user appeal.....
j. high artistic quality and/or literary style
k. quality and variety of format
1. value commensurate with cost and/or need
m. timeliness or permanence
n. integrity ....
The following criteria will be used as they apply.
1. Learning resources shall support and be consistent with the gen-
eral educational goals of the state and district and the aims and objec-
tives of individual school and specific courses.
5. Learning resources shall be designed to help students gain an
awareness of our pluralistic society.
6. Learning resources shall be designed to motivate students and staff
to examine their own attitudes and behaviors and to comprehend their
own duties, responsibilities, rights and privileges as participating citi-
zens in our society.
7. Learning resources shall be selected for their strengths rather than
rejected for their weaknesses.
The selection of learning resources on controversial issues will be
directed towards maintaining a balanced collection representing vari-
ous views.
Learning resources shall clarify historical and contemporary forces
by presenting and analyzing intergroup tension and conflict objec-
tively, placing emphasis on recognizing and understanding social and
economic problems.
Office for Intellectual Freedom of the American Library Association, Workbook
for Selection Policy Writing 5-7 (draft copy, Nov. 16, 1982).
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difference between book removal and book selection challenges
is that in the latter situation, students will have a much more
difficult time establishing their case.2 08 Nonetheless, students
should have the opportunity to raise both challenges.209
IV. CONCLUSION
Local school boards should generally reflect the opinions of
their constituents, but not when doing so infringes upon the
constitutional rights of others, including students. The very
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect certain privileges
from majorities insensitive to individual liberty. Important in-
dividual rights are implicated both when a school board
removes a book and when it consistently excludes works of a
particular ideology from its library shelves.
When the Supreme Court first had an opportunity to con-
front this issue over ten years ago, Justice Douglas poignantly
asked: "Are we sending children to school to be educated by
the norms of the School Board or are we educating our youth
to shed the prejudices of the past, to explore all forms of
thought, and to find solutions to our world's problems?" 210 As
this Comment indicates, the answer to Justice Douglas's ques-
tion must be the latter course.
Accordingly, students should have the opportunity to
demonstrate that school officials are impermissibly prescribing
an official orthodoxy through a library selection process that in-
tentionally excludes works of a specific viewpoint. Any book
removal, moreover, should constitute a prima facie violation of
a student's right to receive information. In order to justify an
unshelving, school officials should have to meet a stringent bur-
den of showing that the removed work posed a real threat to
208. See supra note 110; Niccolai, supra note 63 at 30; Comment, supra note
77 at 135-36. One commentator, while in favor of students having an opportu-
nity to challenge book selections, predicts that students would bring few such
suits because of the difficult proof problems. Id. at 136.
209. This Comment also favors giving students the opportunity to prove
-hat curriculum decisions were impermissibly motivated by an ideological de-
sire to deny students access to certain ideas. See, e.g., Pratt v. Independent
School Dist. No. 831, Forest Lake, Minn., 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982) (ideologi-
cally-based removal of a film from the curriculum violated students' first
amendment rights). Cf. Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979)
(unsuccessful challenge to school board decision to remove ten works from the
recommended reading lists of certain elective English classes. The parties stip-
ulated that the Board decision was not part of a systematic effort to exclude
any particular ideology).
210. Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 409 U.S.
998, 999-1000 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting to denial of cert.).
[Vol. 68:213
1983] THE FIRST AMENDMENT 253
school discipline or the psychological well-being of students.
School boards would clearly be on notice that parental pres-
sure does not justify removal of a book from the school library.
These standards would prevent a school board's exercise of dis-
cretion from impinging upon a student's first amendment
rights.
Martin D. Munic
Carl A. Auerbach
